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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLOBAL ACQUISITIONS NETWORK,  
a Wyoming corporaiton; SHAWN  
CORNEILLE, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,  
a Delaware corporation;  
ORIANA CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC,  
a Connecticut limited  
liability company; ZANCO, a  
company of unknown business  
form, HLB FINANCIAL, LLC, a  
company of unknown form; W/C  
INVESTMETN HOLDINGS INC., a  
Florida corporatin; DEXTER  
CHAPPELL, an individual;  
VALERIE CHAPPELL, an  
individual; JON LEARY, an  
individual; GLEN McINERNEY  
also known as LARRY BENNETT,  
an individual; CHRISTOPHER  
RAY ZANCO, an individual;  
BERNARD WOODSON, an  
individual,

Defendants.

Case No. CV 12-08758 DDP (CWx)

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION  
TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R.  
CIV. P. 12(B)(2)**

[Dkt. No. 65]

Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss  
Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

1 ("Motion"). Having considered the parties' submissions, the Court  
2 denies the Motion and adopts the following Order.

3 **I. BACKGROUND**

4 Plaintiffs are Global Acquisitions Network ("GAN") and Shawn  
5 Corneille. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants  
6 are Oriana Capital Partners ("Oriana"), Dexter Chappell, and Jon  
7 Leary (sometimes referred to herein as the "Oriana Defendants")<sup>1</sup>.  
8 (Id. at ¶¶ 4-7.) Relevant to this motion, Defendant Jon Leary  
9 resides in the State of Connecticut and is licesnsed to practice  
10 law there. Mr. Leary acted as legal counsel for Oriana and Dexter  
11 Chappell, and engaged in business in the State of California. (Id.  
12 at ¶ 7.)

13 Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs are the  
14 owners of two collateralized mortgage obligations ("CMOs") that  
15 have a combined face value of approximately \$2.5 billion. (Id. at  
16 ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs sought opportunities where the CMOs could  
17 generate financial returns by using them as collateral on a loan.  
18 (Id. at ¶ 12.) Having no experience in that particular field, the  
19 Plaintiffs sought help and were introduced to Defendants Leary and  
20 Chappell. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Defendants Chappell and Leary approached  
21 Oriana Capital Partners ("Oriana") who agreed to use the CMOs as  
22 collateral for an approximately \$18 million non-recourse loan  
23 ("NRL") to Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Before consummating the  
24 agreement, the Plaintiffs requested assurances from the Oriana  
25 Defendants that Oriana had the ability to fund the NRL. (Id. at ¶  
26 21.) To address Plaintiffs' concerns, a conference call was

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28 <sup>1</sup>Bank of America was originally a defendant, but was dismissed  
on February 19, 2013. (Dkt. No. 38.)

1 allegedly held on February 9, 2012, at approximately 7:56 a.m.,  
2 between Plaintiffs, the Oriana Defendants, and a Bank of America  
3 Bank Officer whose name Plaintiffs believe was Tom Hazlet or  
4 Hazlit. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The call was identified as originating  
5 from the number 800-432-1000, which Plaintiffs allege is a Bank of  
6 America phone number. (Id. at ¶ 24.) During this call, both the  
7 Oriana Defendants and the Bank Officer, Hazlet or Hazlit, told  
8 Plaintiffs that Bank of America was the primary financial  
9 institution with which Oriana did business and that it would be the  
10 institution funding the credit line for Plaintiffs' non-recourse  
11 loan. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Additionally, the Bank Officer stated that  
12 Oriana had access to a credit line and had the financial resources  
13 to fund the loan. (Id.)

14 Based on these assurances from the Oriana Defendants and the  
15 Bank of America Bank Officer, Plaintiffs decided to transfer the  
16 CMOs to Oriana. The CMOs were delivered to the Fidelity account  
17 designated by Oriana between February 27 and 29, 2012, and they  
18 confirmed receipt of the CMOs. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35; Exh. 2.) On March  
19 12, 2012, Oriana Defendants told Plaintiffs that they would be  
20 unable to fund the loan within the contractually required time  
21 period, so the parties agreed to extend the payout deadline to  
22 April 18. (Id. at ¶ 41.)

23 By June 2, Oriana still had not made the loan to Plaintiffs.  
24 (Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.) Over the next couple of months, the parties  
25 communicated, primarily through counsel, by phone and email about  
26 the status of the loan and the CMOs. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-55.) Mr.  
27 Chappell and Mr. Leary would provide different reasons for the  
28 delay in payment. (Id.; Exh. 5.) Over the course of this

1 communication, Plaintiffs learned that the Fidelity account to  
2 which they had transferred the CMOs was actually owned by a third  
3 party. (Id. at ¶¶ 63-65.) Oriana's name had been added to the  
4 account, but the Oriana Defendants informed Plaintiffs that, as of  
5 July 7, 2012, the account had been closed and Oriana was unable to  
6 obtain any details about the closure because Defendant Chappell was  
7 not listed as an account holder. (Id. at ¶ 68.) At that time, the  
8 Oriana Defendants stated that they did not know what had happened  
9 to the CMOs or where they were located. (Id. at ¶ 86.)

10 Eventually, in an August 6, 2012, email,<sup>2</sup> counsel for the  
11 Oriana Defendants admitted that they misrepresented their ability  
12 to fund the loan through a Bank of America credit line or with  
13 their own funds, but contended that the CMOs were never received in  
14 the Fidelity account. (Id. at ¶ 82.) As of the time of the filing  
15 of Plaintiff's original complaint in October 2012, the Oriana  
16 Defendants still had not paid the loan or returned the CMOs, and  
17 Plaintiffs did not know where the CMOs were located. (Id. at ¶  
18 86.)

19 On February 9, 2013, Defendant Bank of America filed a motion  
20 to dismiss which the Court granted with leave to amend the  
21 complaint. (Dkt. No. 38.) After the FAC was filed, Bank of  
22 America filed a second motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 50.) Its  
23 motion was granted on June 7, 2013. (Dkt. No. 60.)

24 Defendant Jon Leary now moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.  
25 Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.

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27 <sup>2</sup> This August 6, 2012 email is not included with the other  
28 email correspondence attached as the fifth exhibit to Plaintiffs'  
complaint.

## II. LEGAL STANDARD

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). To demonstrate a court's jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff must show that personal jurisdiction is (1) permitted under the applicable state's long-arm statute and that (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate federal due process. Id. California's long-arm statute, Cal. Code. Civ. Pro. § 410.10, allows personal jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution. Cal. Code. Civ. Pro. § 410.10.

A federal district court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a non-forum defendant. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984). Demonstrations of general or specific jurisdiction require that the plaintiff make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts, facts that if taken as true would support jurisdiction and withstand the motion to dismiss. Id.

Any disputed facts for the purposes of the motion to dismiss are construed in favor of the plaintiff. Id. However, a court may permit discovery to help determine whether it has personal jurisdiction, especially in circumstances where pertinent facts are controverted. Data Disc, Inc., v. Systems Tech. Assoc. Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977).

## III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Leary moves to dismiss the complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. He argues that he maintains no contacts

1 with California. Mr. Leary claims to be a lifelong resident of the  
2 State of Connecticut, who has never solicited or conducted business  
3 outside of Massachusetts and Connecticut. (Motion to Dismiss at  
4 4.) Moreover he contends that he has only visited California once,  
5 in 1991, as a tourist and that his only contact with the Plaintiffs  
6 was through email and one phone call. (Mot. to Dismiss at 4.)

7 The Plaintiffs appear to concede that the Court lacks general  
8 jurisdiction; instead, the Plaintiffs argue that the FAC has  
9 sufficiently alleged that this Court can exercise specific  
10 jurisdiction over Mr. Leary.

#### 11 **A. Specific Jurisdiction**

12 Under Ninth Circuit law, a court may exercise specific  
13 jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) a defendant  
14 purposefully directs her activities or consummates some transaction  
15 with the forum or resident thereof, or performs some act by which  
16 she purposefully avails herself of the privilege of conducting  
17 activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and  
18 protections of its laws, (2) the plaintiff's claim arises out of or  
19 relates to the defendant's forum related activities, and (3) the  
20 exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantive  
21 justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin  
22 Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2004).

23 Depending on the type of claim made by a plaintiff, purposeful  
24 direction takes on different meanings. Compare Dole Foods Co.,  
25 Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining how  
26 personal jurisdiction in intentional tort cases is a question of  
27 purposeful direction which is evaluated under the "effects test"  
28 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984))), with

1 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (explaining that personal  
2 jurisdiction in contracts cases is a question of purposeful  
3 availment to the privileges of doing business in the forum state).

4 If a plaintiff can establish the first two prongs, then the  
5 defendant must come forward with a "compelling case" that the  
6 exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Burger King Corp.  
7 v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).

8 **i. Purposeful Direction**

9 Here, the Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Leary purposefully  
10 directed his activities toward residents of California. (See Mot.  
11 to Dismiss at 9.) A purposeful direction analysis is relevant for  
12 tort claims. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. To demonstrate  
13 purposeful direction, the first prong of the test determining  
14 whether a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a  
15 defendant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) committed  
16 an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3)  
17 which caused harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered  
18 in the forum state. Id.(citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783  
19 (1984)).

20 The FAC alleges that Mr. Leary made representations to the  
21 Plaintiffs that the Oriana Defendants would be able to fund the  
22 CMOs; however, Mr. Leary knew that the Oriana Defendants' ability  
23 to pay was contingent on a third party. (FAC at ¶¶ 22-26, 49-50.)  
24 Moreover, the FAC alleges that the Plaintiffs suffered monetary  
25 losses due to Mr. Leary's representations. (Id. at ¶ 90.) These  
26 facts establish that Mr. Leary's actions meet the first and third  
27 prongs of "purposeful direction": that he acted intentionally and  
28 that his actions caused harm to the Plaintiffs in the forum state.

1 The issue is whether Mr. Leary's actions were "expressly aimed" at  
2 the forum state.

3 "Expressly aimed" requires "more" than mere foreseeability;  
4 "expressly aimed" requires that the relevant action in the forum  
5 state be individually targeted to a forum resident, so that the  
6 defendant can reasonably anticipate being hauled into court in the  
7 forum state. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc.,  
8 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,  
9 790 (1984). For example, in Dole, the defendants were found to  
10 have expressly aimed their actions at California, the forum state,  
11 because they knew the decision makers they were communicating with  
12 were located in California. 303 F.3d at 1111; see also Data Disc,  
13 Inc., 557 F.2d at 1288 ("The inducement of reliance in California is  
14 a sufficient act within California to satisfy the requirement of  
15 minimum contacts where the cause of action arises out of that  
16 inducement.").

17 Here, while Mr. Leary did not actively solicit business in  
18 California, his actions were still expressly aimed at the forum  
19 state. Like the defendants in Dole, Mr. Leary knew the Plaintiffs  
20 had California contacts because every email sent to Mr. Leary  
21 contained a signature block with a California address. (FAC, Exh.  
22 5.) These indicia of the Plaintiffs' California contacts created a  
23 reasonable expectation that Mr. Leary could be hauled into court in  
24 California. Mr. Leary is correct that his status as a Connecticut  
25 resident does not allow this Court to exercise general jurisdiction  
26 over him; however, Mr. Leary's communications targeted California  
27 residents and are the basis of the present cause of action, thereby  
28 providing a basis for this Court to exercise specific jurisdiction.



1 Mr. Leary contends that any communication with the Plaintiffs  
2 in California occurred through email and telephone and is therefore  
3 insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. However, courts  
4 have held that limited personal jurisdiction may be based on email  
5 contacts that are intentionally directed to residents of the forum  
6 state and then cause harm in the forum state. See Felland v.  
7 Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 674-76 (7th Cir. 2012) (fraudulent  
8 misrepresentations sent by email, regular mail, and telephone can  
9 be the basis for specific jurisdiction). Here, the Plaintiffs have  
10 attached multiple email exchanges between themselves and Mr. Leary;  
11 these exchanges not only support the negligence and fraud-based  
12 claims against Mr. Leary, but also establish sufficient contacts to  
13 allow this Court to exercise specific jurisdiction.

14 **ii. Arising From**

15 Under the second prong of the specific jurisdiction test,  
16 whether the defendant's actions give rise to the current action is  
17 measured in terms of "but for" causation. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at  
18 1088. Here, the Plaintiffs allege in the FAC that Mr. Leary's  
19 representation about the Oriana Defendants' ability to pay was  
20 essential to the Plaintiffs in deciding whether to transfer the  
21 CMOs. (FAC at ¶ 30.) Mr. Leary does not contend that his  
22 communications with Plaintiffs caused the alleged harm; Mr. Leary  
23 only argues that his California contacts are insufficient to grant  
24 this Court jurisdiction.

25 **iii. Reasonableness**

26 If both of these prongs are met, the burden falls on the  
27 defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be  
28 unreasonable. Felland, 682 F.3d at 674-76. In his Motion to

1 Dismiss, Mr. Leary alleges that his status as a Connecticut  
2 domiciliary means this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction  
3 over him; however, Mr. Leary does argue why exercising personal  
4 jurisdiction over a Connecticut domiciliary would be unreasonable.  
5 The Court declines to speculate a reason why exercising personal  
6 jurisdiction would be unreasonable, but notes that nothing in Mr.  
7 Leary's papers or in the FAC suggests that it would not be  
8 reasonable.

9 **IV. CONCLUSION**

10 For the above reasons, Leary's motion to dismiss for lack of  
11 personal jurisdiction is DENIED. The Plaintiffs have alleged facts  
12 sufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Leary possessed the necessary  
13 minimum contacts with California for this Court to exercise  
14 personal jurisdiction over him.

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16  
17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 Dated: July 9, 2013

  
DEAN D. PREGERSON  
United States District Judge